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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
The study focuses on collective rationality in the behavior of rational agents. The starting point is, however, at the individual rationality as an
explanatory basis. In general rationality is considered as a guiding and explanatory principle from the point of view of the optimal use of
resources. For instance, the model of maximizing the expected utility (= EU) provides the required basis. However, the notion of collective
rationality does not reduce without a residual to the notion of maximizing the EU. If it were, the introduction of collective rationality would be
would be redundant in the other than clarifying sense. In other words, collective rationality would be epiphenomenal. A closer study, however,
reveals that collective rationality has certain irreducible functions. For instance, it corrects the problems of unsatisfactory and indeterminate
resolutions with which rational individuals in separation would be unarmed. Hence, although the explanatory strategy of the study is in part
reductive, its basic ideology is essentially non-reductive. This ambivalent feature of the study is reasonable in virtue of its subject matter.
Collective rationality is expressed in terms of social habits, practices and norms. I will show that the standard game theoretical notions are
inadequate in explicating all social behavior that can be attributed as rational, and they do not capture as such collective rationality expressed by
the social habits. Especially, the notion of rational choice does not correctly describe the behavior of following norms, practices and rules.
Instead the corresponding behavior is better described in virtue of conforming and mutually expecting conformity to a given practice. The
standard solution concept, equilibrium, is substituted by a notion of 'path'. Instead of making choices that enforce equilibria the agents are
conforming to a prevailing practice, and this conformity enforces a path that in turn yields suitable expectations for the future course of action.
The conformity and the mutual expectations for conformity describe a social interaction situation that I will call the 'FUNK GAME'. In the funk
games, and in collective rationality in general, the emphasis is on the indirect maximization of the EURational agents aim at satisfying the
mutual expectations and primarily coordinating their actions, even though the maximization of the EU is at the core of rational behavior. The
point of view of emphasizing the collective rationality leads us into an important constraint. Namely, the skills and capacities of the agents are
limited. Especially, rationality is essentially incomplete.
My study takes a hold on the collective action, its problems and e.g. free riding quite in a new light. For instance, free riding is at the first time
provided with a satisfactory explication from the point of view of the rational agents. This is possible only if individual and collective rationality
can be seen with an eligible coexistence with each other. And such a picture can be provided in terms of the funk games.
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